Just like members of the House, U.S. Senators vary in how effective they are at lawmaking. We adapt the approach of Volden and Wiseman (2014) to create Legislative Effectiveness Scores for each Senator in each of the 93 rd to 113 th Congresses . We use these scores to explore common claims about institutional differences in lawmaking between the House and the Senate. Our analysis offers strong support for the claim that the Senate is a more egalitarian and individualistic lawmaking body, in comparison to the relatively hierarchical institutional structure of the House. The Scores developed here offer scholars numerous opportunities to explore important lawmaking phenomena.
Sen. Edward Kennedy was long known as the "Lion of the Senate." When he unexpectedly fell ill in 2008, Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-NY) called him the "most effective" Senator ever, and Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) said, "I have described Ted Kennedy as the last lion in the Senate…. I have held that view because he remains the single most effective member of the Senate." 2 The fact that high-profile Democrats and Republicans alike take note of the lawmaking effectiveness of U.S. Senators is important.
Often portrayed as the "world's greatest deliberative body," the U.S. Senate is commonly considered to be far more egalitarian and individualistic than the hierarchical and institutionally driven House (i.e., MacNeil and Baker 2013). Given the various "prerogatives" (i.e., Sinclair 2017, 24) of individual Senators to move legislation forward or to gum up the works, it may be less crucial to be in the majority party or to serve as a committee or subcommittee chair in order to influence public policy, in comparison to the House. In contrast, knowing that someone holds a key chair position or serves in the majority party in the House goes a long way toward explaining whether she can achieve lawmaking success.
Following Volden and Wiseman's (2014) work on the House, we create a Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) for each Senator in each of the 93 rd to 113 th Congresses (1973 Congresses ( -2015 .
In line with the view of a relatively egalitarian Senate, we show that these scores feature less variance than do those for the House. In line with the heightened importance of institutional structure in the House, we demonstrate that parties and committees in the Senate, while important, are less determinative of lawmaking effectiveness. Likewise, in line with the relatively individualistic nature of the Senate, we establish that legislators' backgrounds and circumstances are more indicative of lawmaking effectiveness in the Senate than in the House.
Creating Legislative Effectiveness Scores for U.S. Senators
While scholars and casual observers of the Senate can quickly point to examples of Senators whom they believe to be effective lawmakers, such claims are often justified by drawing on extensive biographical materials (e.g., Caro 2002) or illustrative case studies (e.g., Redman 1973) . Despite Matthews' (1960) pioneering work, however, we have very little datadriven analysis about which Senators are effective lawmakers, what makes them effective, and how they became effective. 3 This omission is notable in contrast to the broad attention given to other aspects of the Senate, such as its institutional rules (e.g., Binder and Smith 1997 , Brady and Volden 1998 , Koger 2010 , Krehbiel 1998 , Wawro and Schickler 2006 ), representational role (e.g., Bernhard and Sala 2006 , Gailmard and Jenkins 2009 , or distributional consequences (e.g., Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) . Volden and Wiseman (2014) score each lawmaker in the House through a weighted combination of fifteen indicators, based on the bills sponsored by lawmakers. Specifically, they focus on five stages of the lawmaking process (bill sponsorship, action in committee, action beyond committee, passing the House, and becoming law) across three levels of bill significance (commemorative, substantive, and substantive and significant). These fifteen indicators are appropriate also in the U.S. Senate, with some adaptation. Drawing on data from the Library of Congress website www.congress.gov, we identify how many bills a Senator sponsors, and how many of those receive action in committee (e.g., hearings, markups), action beyond committee (e.g., floor votes), pass the Senate, and become law. In contrast to the House, however, Senate Rule XIV allows Senators to bypass the committee system and place bills directly on the legislative calendar. To account for this rule, we do not credit Senators for "action in committee" in such cases; moreover, such bills are credited for "action beyond committee" only if they received additional attention (e.g., floor debate, amendment, votes). We use the Volden and Wiseman protocol for giving substantive and significant bills ten times the weight of commemoratives and twice the weight of substantive bills. 4 This method gives a larger LES boost for actions that are rarer (later in the lawmaking process) and for more important bills. We normalize the scores to an average value of one within each Congress.
Additional characteristics of the U.S. Senate may also be important for understanding lawmaking and the effectiveness of individual Senators. For instance, Senate Rule XXII allows Senators to filibuster legislation within the limits imposed by a potential cloture vote. The LES, by construction, only captures positive lawmaking actions rather than negative (i.e., dilatory or obstructionist) actions. Therefore, we might expect (and indeed find) that contrarian Senators, such as Tom Coburn (R-OK) or Paul Wellstone (D-MN), score poorly on our metric despite their otherwise great influence. Other examples of Senate activities set aside by the LES include the extensive floor amendments offered on many important bills. In the Supplemental Appendix, we discuss three alternative scores that incorporate credit for successful amendments, how they are highly correlated with the more straightforward LES used here, and how our main results are robust to analyzing these metrics. 5
In total, across the 93 rd through the 113 th Congresses, 69,398 S. bills (public bills sponsored by Senators) were introduced, 4,989 of which were commemorative, and 4,596 of which were substantive and significant. The LES measure based on these bills displays 4 The exact equation for these weights and the overall LES is given in Volden and Wiseman (2014, chapter 2) . We use identical phrases to those of Volden and Wiseman to identify potential commemorative bills (naming of post offices, minting of coins, etc.), and then read the individual bill titles to code as substantive any bill that also dealt with substantive matters. We follow the earlier protocol to code as substantive and significant those bills that were mentioned in the end-of-year summaries of Congressional Quarterly Almanac. 5 That said, an interesting avenue for future research would be to explore whether amending activities and bill introductions are complementary or substitute strategies for certain legislators. 
The Egalitarian and Individualistic Senate
The correlates of Legislative Effectiveness Scores illustrate the similarities and differences between the House and the Senate as lawmaking institutions. To make these comparisons as complete and current as possible, we also updated the House LES from Volden 6 Cannon shepherded four substantive and four substantive and significant bills that he sponsored into law during that Congress, including Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980 (S. 2622) and The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 Act of (S. 1946 . 7 Any Senator who served for only a portion of one Congress and did not introduce any bills was excluded from the dataset, both for the calculation of Legislative Effectiveness Scores and for subsequent analyses. 8 Supplemental Appendix C offers a complete list of top Freshmen. and Wiseman (2014) to include the 111 th -113 th Congresses (2009-15) . We use the resulting data to test three hypotheses about House-Senate differences. First, the Senate is perceived to be more egalitarian than the House. Second, parties and committees are more crucial to lawmaking in the much larger House than in the Senate. Third, the characteristics of individual legislators are more likely to influence lawmaking success in the Senate than in the House.
The first of these hypotheses can be assessed simply with a test of LES variance in the House versus that in the Senate (e.g., Brown and Forsythe 1974) . While the LES is normalized to a mean of 1.0 in each Congress in each chamber, the standard deviations of these measures are quite different. 9 As noted above, Senate scores range from zero to 10.2; they have a standard deviation of 1.02. The House LES ranges from zero to 18.7 (Charles Rangel, D-NY, 110 th Congress), with a standard deviation of 1.58. This standard deviation in the House is both substantively and statistically (p < 0.001) larger, indicative of the Senate being a much more egalitarian institution wherein fewer lawmakers dramatically outperform their peers.
To explore our second and third hypotheses, we conduct a series of OLS regressions, regressing LES on several institutional and individualistic independent variables. Details and summary statistics for all variables are given in the Supplemental Appendix. We expect that being in the Majority Party, or serving as a Committee Chair, a Subcommittee Chair, or Majority Party Leader will all be more important to attaining a high LES in the House than in the Senate.
Likewise, in line with Volden and Wiseman (2014) , serving as Minority Party Leader or on a 9 Because of the normalization to a mean of one in each Congress and each chamber, scholars should be cautious about making cross-chamber comparisons. That said, the cross-chamber similarities in scores for lawmakers who moved from the House to the Senate lead us to believe that House-Senate scales are fairly comparable. Below we explore the extent to which effective lawmakers in the House become effective Senators. Future work placing different Congresses and chambers on a common scale -such as through a fuller use of "bridge observations" of Senators who also served in the House -would be welcome.
Power Committee will direct one's efforts away from personal lawmaking effectiveness, perhaps more so in the House than the Senate.
In contrast, we expect non-institutional characteristics, indicative of one's individual experiences and circumstances, to be more impactful in the Senate than in the House. Along these lines, we explore the role of State Legislative Experience both directly and interacted with Legislative Professionalism (e.g., Squire 1992) . Anticipating those near the median to be more effective (e.g., Black 1948), we include Distance from Median. Expecting women (e.g., Anzia and Berry 2011), especially in the minority party (Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013) , to be more effective, we include Majority-Party Women and Minority-Party Women. Pronounced seniority effects would be detected through the variables Freshman, Seniority, and Seniority Squared. Limits in coalition building around common causes by racial and ethnic minorities may come to light in African American and Latino variables. Responsiveness to one's electoral environment may be reflected in measures of Vote Share and Vote Share Squared.
In Table 1 we report regression results for all of these variables with side-by-side House-Senate comparisons. Even though the scores are not directly comparable across chambers, such analysis allows us to assess whether the marginal impact of a variable on the average Representative's LES is of the same direction and magnitude as it is for the average Senator's LES. As predicted, each of the six institutional variables features a coefficient that is larger in the House than in the Senate. Collectively, these differences are statistically significant (p < 0.001). 10 Substantively, it is still the case that majority party members, and especially those 10 To conduct this test, we pooled together the Senate and House data, running a fully interactive model, featuring all of the independent variables in Table 1 independently as well as each interacted with a Senate indicator. An F-test of joint significance of the interactions on the six institutional variables yielded F(6, 2073) = 23.0 (p < 0.001). in committee or subcommittee chair positions, are more effective as lawmakers in the Senate; but these effects are notably smaller (especially for chairs) than their dominant role in the House.
In contrast, the individual-oriented variables appear to be more important in the Senate.
For example, the heightened effectiveness of those with professional state legislative experience is more pronounced in the Senate than in the House; and women in the minority party have approximately a 19% boost in effectiveness in the Senate compared to a 12% boost in the House, relative to the average lawmaker. The nonlinear variables are more difficult to interpret, but they reveal greater swings in effectiveness in the Senate over the House in terms of seniority and vote share, consistent with greater influence of these concerns in the Senate, in contrast to the import of institutional positions in the House. Collectively, there is strong statistical support for House-Senate differences in these variables (p < 0.001) based on a joint F-test. In a More specifically, all Senators who were identified as being part of the "congressional leadership" in the Almanac of the American Politics, with the exception of campaign committee chairmen and/or chairs of the party committee on rules were designated as being majority or minority party leaders. b More specifically, for the purposes of our analysis, a Senator is coded as sitting on a power committee if he/she sits on one of the top-four highest ranked committees, according to Groseclose-Stewart Scores (i.e., Groseclose 1999, Edwards and Stewart 2006 
Supplemental Appendix B: Legislative Effectiveness and Amendment Activity
Of the 54,342 S. bills that were introduced into the Senate in the 97 th -113 th Congresses, 1,806 bills (3.32%) were successfully amended. Of the 2,463 commemorative bills that were introduced, 0.89% of them were successfully amended; of the 48,609 substantive bills that were introduced, 1.65% of them were successfully amended; finally, of the 3,270 substantive and significant bills that were introduced, 30.09% were successfully amended.
To explore the robustness of our findings to the influence of amendment activity, we alter our LES formula in the following three ways. First, we create a new measure of LES, which we denote LES Amendment (1) where a Senator receives 50% of the credit for any bill that she sponsors as it moves through the legislative process if it is subsequently amended; and every
Senator who successfully offered an amendment to the bill splits the remaining 50% of the credit for the bill equally (regardless of how many successful amendments a Senator proposed).
Second, we create another alternative measure of LES, which we denote LES Amendment (2),
where a Senator receives 50% of the credit for any bill that she sponsors that is subsequently amended; and every Senator who successfully offered an amendment to the bill splits the remaining 50% of the credit in direct proportion to the fraction of successful amendments that he
proposed. Finally, we create a third alternative measure of LES, which we denote LES As illustrated in Table B1 below, we see that the core substantive findings that are presented in Table 1 Notes: Dependent Variable is Legislator i's Legislative Effectiveness Score in Congress t, where Models 2, 3, and 4 account for amendment activity in the manner described above. Ordinary least squares estimation, robust standard errors in parentheses, observations clustered by member. *p < 0.10 (two-tailed), **p < 0.05 (two-tailed), ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed). Table B2 presents similar analysis to replicate the findings in Table 2 . On the whole, the findings reported throughout the paper are robust to inclusion of amendment activity in calculating the Senate LES. (1) (2) (3) (4) LES LES Amdt (1 where Models 2, 3, and 4 account for amendment activity in the manner described above. Ordinary least squares estimation, robust standard errors in parentheses, observations clustered by member. *p < 0.10 (two-tailed), **p < 0.05 (two-tailed), ***p < 0.01 (two-tailed).
